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Abstract
While corporate taxation is a major issue in the debate over interna-
tional finance, economic theory has no clear stance on who bears its bur-
den. On balance, economists seem still more prone to accept that taxing
profits does not affect corporations’ outcomes. This paper makes three
cases for non-neutrality. First, since corporate taxation is asymmetric be-
tween profit and loss, the tax rate may change the ranking of alternative
investments. Secondly, the imperfect observability of the use of internal re-
sources makes pure economic profits very difficult to detect. Thirdly, when
the pervasive role of entrepreneurship is fully taken into account, corporate
taxation appears clearly as a direct tax on market adjustments and as an in-
direct tax on wages.
JEL Codes: H25, H22, B25, L26.
1 Introduction
In 2007, top marginal corporate tax rates among the member countries of the
European Union ranged from a low of 10% (Bulgaria and Cyprus) to a high of
38,36% (Germany), with Italy closely following with a rate of 37,25 percent. In
the world list of top corporate taxing countries, Japan scores first with a rate of
40.7%, followed by US and Germany, with the average level of corporate taxes in
the EU declining from 38% in 1993 to 24.2% in 2007 (KPMG, 2007). This trend
toward decrease, which is not limited to EU, is mainly due to the competition
between countries to attract and keep foreign investment. In 1998, corporate
tax revenues represented approximately 11 percent of U.S. federal government
revenues, or 2.2 percent of U.S. gross domestic product.
While the link between higher indirect taxes and higher prices is obvious to
anyone who buys goods and services, the actual incidence of corporate tax is less
well understood. Thus, it comes as no surprise that economic literature has not
delivered any neat result about who pays corporate taxes, yet. In the standard
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textbook exposition, the incidence of this kind of taxes is rarely put into dis-
cussion and the most common result is that taxing profits does not change the
production choices, independently of market structure. In the stream of more
technically oriented literature, Krzyzaniak and Musgrave (1963) maintain that
corporate taxation can be shifted backward or forward, due to market structure.
Using a competitive general equilibriummodel, Harberger (1962) proves that the
tax is fully passed backward to capital owners. Feldstein, Green, and Sheshinski
(1979) demonstrate that backward shifting is impossible in the case of a perfectly
elastic capital supply. The implications of corporate taxation for the allocation
of financial resources are somewhat more clear. In the effort of reducing their tax
obligations, corporations generally are induced to use debt rather than equity fi-
nance, for interest payments to bondholders are deductible from taxable income,
while dividend payments to corporate shareholders are not: in this perspective,
Auerbach (2005) provides strong evidence that this results in higher debt/equity
ratios.
The aim of this paper is showing that the case for corporate tax neutrality
does not hold as a general rule. To prove this result, the section 2 reviews the tra-
ditional neoclassical model used to demonstrate that corporate taxes do not im-
pact on firm’s decisions: this result holds true only to a very limited extent, since
it ignores uncertainty and investment choices. Section 3 reviews three main rea-
sons why the effects of taxing profits may be far from neutral. First, under very
general conditions, corporate taxes may change the ranking of alternative invest-
ment choices, even though the distribution of uncertain outcomes is fully known
to the entrepreneur. Secondly, since current taxation procedures rely on book
values, pure entrepreneurial activities become depressed in favor of deductible
monetary costs. Thirdly, the Austrian approach marks a drastic departure from
the neoclassical paradigm, for it assumes entrepreneurship as the essence of firm’s
activities: in this framework of intrinsically uncertain knowledge, taxing corpo-
rations reduces market efficiency, equilibrium adjustment, and long-run growth
of wages.
2 The case of neutrality
The standard public finance literature (Ulbrich, 2003; Cullis and Jones, 1998;
Musgrave and Musgrave, 1989; Brown and Jackson, 1982; Steve, 1976) treats the
problem of corporate taxation focusing exclusively on the highly stylized model
of the neoclassical firm, whose only control variable is the size of production1.
For a neoclassical firm, the objective function is:
max
q
pi (q) = p (q) q − c (q)
where q ∈ ℜ+0 is the size of production, pi ∈ ℜ is profit, p (q) is the inverse
demand curve, and c (q) ∈ ℜ+0 is the total cost function, including wages, other
1An exception to this way of presenting tax corporation is provided by Stiglitz (2000).
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variable costs, interest paid, and capital depreciation. Under the assumption of
differentiability with regard to c and p, maximization of pi requires
∂ p (q)
∂ q
q + p (q) =
∂ c (q)
∂ q
: (1)
at the optimal size q∗, the marginal revenue from selling q∗ units of product must
equal the marginal cost needed to produce them.
In this context, corporate taxation turns the profit function into
piθ (q) = (1−θ) [p (q) q − c (q)]
where θ ∈ [0,1] is the tax rate. No matter what the value of θ, optimality
condition (1) continues to hold, since both sides of the equation are affected
by the tax rate in the same proportion. Economically relevant resources are
not diverted away from their current uses: simply, government collects revenues
equal to θpiθ (q
∗). The incidence analysis is straightforward: What is changing
here is just income distribution–a net transfer from stockholders to government
bureaucrats–but the total wealth available to society is unaffected, since q∗ does
not depend on θ.
To investigate whether the corporate tax impacts the long-run equilibrium
of a given sector, we must make further assumptions on market structure. This
is what we assume: (1) all sectors are taxed at the same rate and (2) the sector
under study is perfectly competitive. It follows that in the long run the following
relation must hold also
∂ p (q)
∂ q
q + p (q) = p∗ =
∂ c (q)
∂ q
=
c (q∗)
q∗
;
in other words, the long-run price, endogenously determined by exits and entries
of firms, would be large enough to just cover average costs, thus driving profits
to zero, as well as revenues from corporate taxes. This result corroborates what
was previously obtained in the case of short run: corporate tax is completely
neutral with regard to quantity determination and also to the number of firms
operating in a given sector. Even though the total collected revenues for the
government grow linearly with the firm’s total profit, the effect of corporate
taxation is exactly the same as a lump-sum tax.
3 The case of non-neutrality
The previous model of fiscal incidence leaves no room for allocational effects of
corporate taxation. This extreme result was obtained under the assumption of
perfect knowledge of selling price and no uncertainty over costs and revenues.
As soon as we depart from this scenario, tax neutrality invariably disappears.
Whether we introduce uncertainty, imperfect observation of profits, or actual
entrepreneurship, potential welfare losses and market distortions arise.
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3.1 Uncertainty
Consider the following scenario. A risk-neutral entrepreneur can choose between
two alternative risky investments, namely a and b , which assume values x i ∈ℜ,
with i ∈ {a, b} and a known cumulative distribution function of probability
F (x i ) = Pr{t ≤ x i}, with t ∈ (−∞,∞). The expected value of both investments
is assumed strictly greater than zero. To simplify matters, assume that no variable
production cost is involved by any project. Given all this, the expected return of
the i -th investment is
E

x i

=
∫ +∞
−∞
x idF (x i ).
Provided entrepreneur’s neutrality toward risk, we have
a  b ⇒ E [xa]≥ E x b
i.e., only expected returns matter to him. Now, assume that profits are taxed with
a constant rate θ ∈ [0,1] if and only if their realized value is greater than zero. In
this case the expected return of the i -th investment becomes
E

x i |θ= ∫ 0
−∞
x idF (x i )+ (1−θ)
∫ +∞
0
x idF (x i ).
Other things being equal, then, the introduction of corporate tax decreases the
expected return in the case of success. We are ready to demonstrate the following
Theorem 1 When positive profits are taxed, the value of θ changes the relative prof-
itability of mutually exclusive investments.
Proof. Since positive profits are taxed, investment a is chosen in place of b when
(1−θ)
∫ +∞
0
xadF (xa)−
∫ +∞
0
x b dF (x b )

≥∫ 0
−∞
x b dF (x b )−
∫ 0
−∞
xadF (xa) (2)
Without loss of generality, assume that the difference on left side of the inequality
is strictly greater than zero, that is to say that∫ +∞
0
xadF (xa)≥
∫ +∞
0
x b dF (x b ) : (3)
as long as the term on the right side is negative, the inequality is preserved no
matter what the value of θ. On the contrary, when the term on the right side is
positive, the inequality holds as long as
θ≤ 1−
∫ 0
−∞ x
b dF (x b )− ∫ 0−∞ xadF (xa)∫+∞
0 x
adF (xa)− ∫+∞0 x b dF (x b ) (4)
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Naming θ¯ the value of θ for which the previous inequality holds as an equality,
it follows immediately that when θ ≥ θ¯ then the b investment shows a higher
expected value than a, even though the expected value without taxes of a is higher
than b ’s. The ranking of profits from alternative investments is thus affected by
θ.
Example 1 Consider two investment projects such that their probabilities of success
are pa = 0.5 e pb = 0.64 with returns equal to x
1
a = 200 and x
2
a = −10 for the a
project and x1
b
= 180 and x2
b
= −50 for the b project. The expected return of the a
project is 95, whereas the expected return of the b project is 97.2. It follows that b
should be the chosen one. However, when the corporate tax rate is θ > 0.14, then the
a project is chosen instead.
From the previous theorem it is straightforward to prove the following
Corollary 1 Assume that the entrepreneur must pay a fraction θ of the profits in
case of success, while receiving a unitary subsidy equal to φ in case of failure. Then,
the choice between mutually exclusive investments does not depend on the values of
θ or φ only when θ=φ.
Proof. Introducing loss subsidy, condition (2) becomes
(1−θ)
∫ +∞
0
xadF (xa)−
∫ +∞
0
x b dF (x b )

≥
(1−φ)
∫ 0
−∞
x b dF (x b )−
∫ 0
−∞
xadF (xa)

(5)
because of the linear property of the expected value. This expression is indepen-
dent of tax and subsidy rates only when θ = φ. In this case, the comparison
between the profitability of alternative investment projects is restored to the case
of no taxation and the ranking between them is unaffected. Now, the fiscal policy
of the government is completely neutral with regard to the investment choice.
In very general terms, corporate taxes do modify entrepreneurial choices2,
unless the government subsidizes losses using a unitary rate of the same value.
Only in this case, therefore, corporate tax is made neutral.
2Assuming that the utility function defined over the set of returns is decreasing in the risk and
that the same function has the expected utility property, i.e.
u
 
p ◦ x1⊕ (1− p) ◦ x2= pu(x1)+ (1− p)u(x2)
where p is the probability of success, with x1 > 0 and x2 < 0, the same results obtained in the case
of linearity also hold true.
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3.2 Earnings and Profit
A more realistic perspective on the incidence of corporate tax must necessarily
take into account how the tax is determined and administered. Following Lon-
gobardi (2005) we make a distinction between earnings and economic profit.
Definition 1 (Earnings) Earnings are the difference between revenues and costs de-
fined on the commercial year. It is equal to
u = p (q)−weLe − reKe −C −A
where weLe are total paid wages, reKe is the using cost of capital rental, C is the
value of intermediate goods, and A is the capital depreciation.
Definition 2 (Profit) Profit is what the entrepreneur receives once that all factors
of production are paid at the opportunity cost. It is equal to
pi= u −wpLp − rpKp
where wpLp is the implicit salary obtained by the entrepreneur and rpKp is the
figurative using cost of the capital owned by the firm.
It is a matter of fact that corporate taxes are almost universally based on earn-
ings because the figurative costs wLe + rKe cannot be readily obtained by stan-
dard bookkeeping procedures. Provided that u ≥ pi, it follows that the usual
techniques of corporate taxation based on observation of earnings systematically
overestimate the economic profit obtained by the entrepreneurs. Furthermore,
this kind of taxation creates a distortion in the use of resources. To see why,
consider the case of a firm operating in a perfectly competitive market in which
earnings are taxed. The profit function of this firm is
pi (θ) = (1−θ)p f Ke ,Kp ,Le ,Lp−wLe − rKe + F−wLp − rKp
where we have made the following substitutions: w = we = wp , r = re = rp ,
F = C +A. From the inspection of first order conditions for the maximization
of pi with regard to internal resources we have
∂ f
∂ Kp
=
r
p (1−θ)
∂ f
∂ Lp
=
w
p (1−θ) ;
under the assumption of decreasing returns to internal capital and entrepreneu-
rial work, the optimal employment of these two factors must decline in response
to corporate taxation based on earnings3. Also in this case, taxing profits is far
from neutral, since it implies the substitution of internal capital with external
capital and substitution of entrepreneurial activities with labor.
3This result is consistent with the ones obtained by Harberger (1964).
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3.3 The Austrian approach
Perhaps, the most radical critique to neutrality in the case of corporate taxation
comes from the Austrian school of economics. This peculiar methodological ap-
proach can frame the question of tax incidence from a very different viewpoint,
for Austrians explicitly endorse a fully entrepreneurial concept of the firm. The
idea of entrepreneurship is all but new to economic theory: since the very begin-
ning of the economic science4, economists have realized that entrepreneurship
is not an accidental qualification of a firm’s life, rather lying at its very core.
Unfortunately, no economist from the classical school ever focused on the entre-
preneurial function (Blaug, 1997, p. 442) and the whole stream of classical eco-
nomics lacks completely the analysis of dynamic action taken by real individuals
(Gopakumar, 1995). Furthermore, neoclassical economics, with its strong em-
phasis on perfect knowledge and mathematical maximization procedures, leaves
no room for entrepreneurial activities which, by their own nature, rely more
on creating new knowledge rather than using existing knowledge. True, a world
without entrepreneurship would look like the idealized walrasian prototype and
no action would ever be taken5. However, actual economic life is very different.
According to the Austrian approach, real markets adjust continuously to
modifications in preferences, technologies, and resource availabilities. This pro-
cess of constant change creates new profit opportunities: only alert entrepreneurs
who succeed in anticipating the new patterns of consumption gain a positive
profit; those who fail suffer from loss. Up to this point, the approach of the
Austrian school does not departs from the neoclassical economics’ theory of en-
trepreneurship. Nevertheless, Kirzner (1997) explicitly states that, contrary to
popular wisdom, profits are not the payment for any productive input, notwith-
standing the potential for creating additional wealth. Entrepreneurship is not a
kind of systematic search for profit, since any systematic pattern of behavior is
predictable and leads ultimately to zero profits. Realized profits, in the Austrian
tradition, far from being a normal component of income, mark the presence of
disequilibrium in the marketplace and successful entrepreneurial activities.
This point needs clarification. Factors of production are always paid in ad-
vance: their monetary payment is exchanged for the use of scarce resources and
is never conditional upon the success of the firm. Profit is a different source of
wealth, since the kind of uncertainty faced by the entrepreneur is intrinsically
unpredictable. If it were at least partly predictable, i.e. if the average return of en-
trepreneurial activity were stable and known in advance, then that action would
soon become a part of the management routine and others entrepreneurs would
follow in pursuing the same strategy. As soon as a profitable idea becomes com-
mon knowledge, it does not bring profitable results any longer. Unfortunately,
positive profits in a given year do not necessarily imply the same gain during
4The two classical references are Cantillon (1755) and Say (1817). Other remarkable contribu-
tions include Schumpeter (1911); Mises (1998a); Kirzner (1976, 1997).
5On the Austrian concept of human action see Rothbard (1962, chap.1).
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the next year. It follow that the standard marginal analysis cannot be properly
applied to entrepreneurial activity.
So, what is the role for corporate taxation in this context of uncertainty?
Since taxing profits operates only when profits are positive, it does decrease in-
centives for talented entrepreneurs to engage in satisfying consumers’ wants. In-
dividuals find convenient to engage more in routine tasks and less in innovation,
speculation, forecasting, and so the economy’s growth rate and capital accumu-
lation decline. Prices adjust to equilibrium values more slowly, the economy
becoming less flexible and more sensible to external shocks. In other words,
taxing profits not only affects the incentives to pursue an already-known alterna-
tive, but it also affects the incentives to adopt a not-yet-known course of action
(Sautet, 2005). The individual incentive to create new information is affected and
the outcome is a society in which people are less informed and less responsive
to consumer’s preferences. Contrary to the neoclassical case described in (3.1),
in this context subsidizing losses would not alleviate the problem, rather making
it worse, for it would also decrease the incentive to avoid losses: entrepreneurial
activities would be weakened even more6.
Last but not least, Mises (1998b) also contends the point that taxing prof-
its can permanently shift the balance between capital and labor. Since in the
long run corporate taxation decreases the level of capital accumulation in the
economy, the marginal productivity of labor cannot grow and so cannot wages.
Consequently, the only real source for the enrichment of labor class is severely
damaged. This perverse effect works against the intention of the political par-
ties which support corporate taxation on the ground that capitalists and workers
fight over the distribution of a cake of given size. This unintentional effect on
salaries and wages is less apparent than other distortions, but probably lies among
the most severe ones.
4 Conclusion
The growing awareness that low corporate tax rates are crucial to attract foreign
investments has not been translated in a consistent set of analytical results, yet.
Most of the literature on the incidence of corporate tax either relies on patently
unrealistic assumptions on investment possibilities or neglects the key role played
by entrepreneurs. Likely, the apparent lack of well-established results in this field
is due to the missing link of entrepreneurship, an issue which is almost absent or
downplayed in the neoclassical theory of the firm. The distortions induced by
taxing corporations are countless and the dynamic effects on capital formation,
wages, and market adjustments appear extremely relevant. Nonetheless, fiscal
6Using a neoclassical approach to entrepreneurship, but taking into account some simple forms
uncertainty, Cullen and Gordon (2007) show evidence that US personal income tax also affects
entrepreneurial risk taking, a result which corroborates previously obtained results (Feldstein and
Slemrod, 1980).
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competition is constantly improving the world economy.
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